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Usery in the Wake of Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission v. Mississippi 
Ronald D. Rotunda* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1941, the Supreme Court characterized the tenth amend-
ment as a "truism" of little practical importance.I This restrictive 
view echoed even earlier interpretations,z and portended the 
Court's view of federalism for nearly the next four decades. By 
the mid 1970's, the tenth amendment was reduced to a mere ex-
pression of sentiment whose time had passed. Then in June of 
1976, in National League of Cities v. Usery3 the Supreme Court, 
for the first time since the Court Packing Plan, invalidated an Act 
of Congress utilizing tenth amendment principles. This paper will 
focus on the leading post-Usery decision, Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission (FERC) v. Mississippi, 4 and conclude that it sig-
nificantly restricts Usery's impact. 
In Usery itself, the precise issue was the validity of the 1974 
Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act, extending the Act's 
minimum wage, maximum hour, and overtime provisions to al-
most all public employees. By a five to four vote,s the Supreme 
Court invalidated the law. Overruling prior decisions, the Court 
asserted that to the extent the Fair Labor amendments operated to 
"directly displace the State's freedom to structure integral opera-
tions in areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not 
within the authority granted Congress by [the commerce clause)."6 
• Professor of Law, University of Illinois. The author wishes to thank Christine 
Charysh for her helpful research assistance and Professors John Muench, Rod Smolla, and 
John Nowak for reading the manuscript and offering suggestions. 
I. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). 
2. As Chief Justice Marshall noted over 150 years ago, the tenth amendment had 
been framed merely "for the purpose of quieting the excessive jealousies which had been 
excited ... " McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316. 406 (1819). 
3. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
4. 456 u.s. 742 (1982). 
5. Justice Blackmun wrote a concurring opinion but also joined the majority opin-
ion. Several courts and commentators have erroneously characterized the majority deci-
sion as a plurality opinion. Eg., United Transportation Union v. Long Island Railroad 
Company, 634 F.2d 19, 24 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 678 (1982). 
6. 426 U.S. at 852. Fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health. and 
43 
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Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, conceded that this legislation 
was within the plenary commerce power granted to Congress. As 
applied to "States qua States,"7 however, the legislation encoun-
tered the "constitutional barrier"s of state sovereignty.9 
The Court saw a state's power to set the wages of its employ-
ees as an "undoubted attribute of state sovereignty."w By impos-
ing wage and hour limits, the federal statute could potentially 
force reductions in state-provided public services, as well as se-
verely restrict the states' control over their own employees. In 
short, the Act was invalid because it "directly supplant[ed] the 
considered policy choices of the states' elected officials" It in areas 
of "integral governmental functions."t2 
Justice Blackmun cast the pivotal fifth vote. His separate 
concurrence interpreted the majority opinion as adopting a bal-
ancing approach, in which the burden imposed upon the states 
and the extent of interference with state autonomy are weighed 
against the magnitude of the federal interest. For example, he 
said, the decision would not "outlaw federal power in areas such 
as environmental protection where the federal interest is demon-
strably greater and where state facility compliance with imposed 
federal standards would be essential."t3 Many lower courts and 
commentators quickly adopted Blackmun's balancing approach.t4 
Justice Brennan, in a dissent joined by Justices White and 
Marshall, vigorously attacked the foundation of the majority 
opinion and asserted that the legislature is the only appropriate 
parks and recreation were enumerated as examples of "traditional governmental func-
tions."" fd at 851. 
7. Jd at 847. 
8. Jd at 841. 
9. fd at 845. 
10. Jd 
II. Jd at 848. 
12. Jd at 855. 
13. /d. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
14. See, e.g., Woods v. Homes Structures, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1270. 1296-97 (D. Kan. 
1980) (balancing federal interest in requiring bond issues to comply with federal antifraud 
provisions against local government's power to issue bonds); Colorado v. Veterans Admin., 
430 F. Supp. 551, 559 (D. Colo. 1977) (federal interest in monitoring veterans educational 
benefits program balanced against interference with state educational institutions). modi· 
jied. 602 F.2d 926 (lOth Cir. 1979). cerr. denied, 444 U.S. 1014 (1980). See also Barber, 
Naa'onal League of Cities v. Usery: New Meaningfor the Tenth Amendment.~ 1976 SuP. CT. 
REv. 161, 164 (Usery "would thus transport us from a regime which has sacrificed states' 
sovereignty for congressional supremacy to a regime in which the Court will balance states' 
rights against interests represented by Congress."); Note, Practical Federalism After Na· 
tiona/ League of Cities: A Proposal, 69 GEO. L.J. 773, 780 ( 1981) ("the majority's treatment 
of Fry and Justice Blackmun's concurrence point to the conclusion that Usery employs a 
balancing test"). 
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forum for the resolution of such federalism questions. Is Charac-
terizing the majority's analysis as "an abstraction without sub-
stance, founded neither in the words of the Constitution, nor on 
precedent,"I6 he condemned the majority for engaging in un-
abashed policymaking and manufacturing a lengthy legal argu-
ment merely as "a transparent cover for invalidating a 
congressional judgment with which they disagree."I 7 Justice Ste-
vens, also dissenting, concluded that the statute was valid since he 
was "unable to identify a limitation on [the commerce power] that 
would not also invalidate federal regulations of state activities that 
I consider unquestionably permissible .... "Is Outside the 
Court, Usery precipitated criticism and comment that was ex-
traordinary both for its breadth and its severity.I9 
II. LIMITATIONS PRIOR TO FERC v. MISSISSIPPI 
By its terms, Usery applies only to statutes enacted pursuant 
to Congress' commerce power. By way of footnote the Court ex-
plained that it was not deciding whether the tenth amendment 
also limited Congress' spending power,2o its enforcement power 
under section five of the fourteenth amendment,2I or the war 
p0wer.22 
Many lower court decisions have concluded that the tenth 
amendment places no limits on the exercise of congressional pow-
ers derived from these sources.23 No evidence exists that the 
15. 426 U.S. at 858 (Brennan. 1., dissenting). See also Wechsler, The Po/ilica/ Safe-
guards of Federalism: The Role of !he Slales in 1he Compos1iion and Se/eclion of !he Na-
liona/ Governmenl, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954), ci!ed in 426 U.S. at 877. Brennan also 
found insurmountable practical obstacles to applying the ''traditional government func-
tions" test. 426 U.S. at 880. 
16. ld. at 860. 
17. ld at 867. 
18. ld at 881 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
19. See, e.g., Beard & Ellington, A Commerce Power Seesaw: Balancing Naliona/ 
League of Cilies, II GA. L. REV. 35 ( 1976 ); Choper, The Scope of Naliona/ Power Vis-a- Vis 
!he S1a1es: The Dispensabi/i~y of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977); Cox, Federalism 
and Individual Righls Underlhe Burger Courl, 73 Nw. U.L. REv. I (1978); Heldt, The Ten!h 
Amendmenl Iceberg, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1963 (1979); Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice: 
Problems of Federalism in Mandaling S1a1e lmp!emen/alion of Naliona/ Environmenlal Pol-
icy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977); Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Consliluliona/ism, 42 
OHIO ST. L.J. 411,420-421 (1981). 
20. 426 U.S. at 852, n.17. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I. 
21. 426 U.S. at 855, n.l7. 
22. ld at 854, n.I8. ciling wilh approval Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946). 
23. See, e.g., New Hampshire Department of Employment Security v. Marshall, 616 
F.2d 240, 247 (1st Cir. 1980) (spending power); Jennings v. Illinois Office of Education, 589 
F.2d 935, 938 (7th Cir.). cen. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979) (war power); North Carolina ex. 
rel Morrow v. Califano, 445 F. Supp. 532, 536 n.IO (E.D.N.C. 1977) (spending power). 
ajf'd mem., 435 U.S. 962 (1978). 
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Supreme Court would disagree with these lower court decisions.24 
Recent Supreme Court case law reaffirms the principle that Usery 
is inapplicable to federal regulations which states must accept as a 
condition of receiving federal grants, because even if the federal 
bribe is very high, the states have a "choice" whether to partici-
pate.25 Similarly, only four days after Usery, Justice Rehnquist, 
writing for the Court in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 26 reasoned that the 
fourteenth amendment's broad enforcement power overrides the 
restrictions on federal power of earlier amendments. 
Later the Court created additional limitations on Usery. In 
Hodel v. Virginia Suiface Mining & Reclamation Association, 21 the 
Court offered a three-pronged test for deciding tenth amendment 
claims: 
First, there must be a showing that the challenged statute regulates the "States as 
States." Second, the federal regulation must address matters that are indisputably 
"attributes of state sovereignty." And third, it must be apparent that the States' 
compliance with the federal law would directly impair their ability "to structure 
24. Montgomery County v. Califano, 449 F. Supp. 1230 (D. Md. 1978), affd mem., 
599 F.2d 1048 (4th Cir. 1979); Florida Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Serv. v. Califano. 
449 F. Supp. 274 (N.D. Fia.),affdmem., 585 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 
931 (1979). See Comment, Toward New Safeguards on Conditional Spending: Implications 
of National League of Cities v. Usery. 26 AM. U.L. REv. 726 (1977). See generally. P. HAY 
& R. ROTUNDA, THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL SYSTEM: LEGAL INTEGRATION IN THE 
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 173-8 (1982). 
25. See Bell v. New Jersey, 103 S. Ct. 2187 (1983), a unanimous decision. Bell held 
that the federal government may recover funds advanced to a state as part of a federal 
grant-in-aid program but then misused by the state. The Court reasoned that collecting the 
money from the State does not violate the tenth amendment because 
[r)equiring States to honor the obligations voluntarily assumed as a condition of 
federal funding before recognizing their ownership of funds simply does not in-
trude on their sovereignty. The State chose to participate in the Title I program 
and, as a condition of receiving the grant, freely gave its assurances that it would 
abide by the conditions of Title I. 
ld at 2197 (emphasis added). 
26. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). In Fitzpatrick, the Court, per Rehnquist. J .. determined that 
the eleventh amendment and the principle of state sovereignty it embodies are limited by 
the enforcement provision of the fourteenth amendment. 
Although Fitzpatrick dealt with the federal government's right to infringe upon the 
state's rights protected by the eleventh amendment, its message was clear: if federal legisla-
tion is properly founded on section five of the fourteenth amendment, it may infringe on 
attributes of state sovereignty protected by other constitutional amendments which the 
fourteenth amendment, by its own terms, was meant to affect. Thus the Court. relying on 
Fitzpatrick, later upheld a federal court's remedial order in a school desegregation case. 
even though it would have a substantial impact on the state treasury. because the "Tenth 
Amendment's reservation of nondelegated powers . . . is not implicated by a federal court 
judgment enforcing the express prohibitions of unlawful state conduct enacted by the 
Fourteenth Amendment." Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 291 (1977) (emphasis added). 
See also, Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980) (fifteenth amendment also overrides 
state sovereignty limitations). 
27. 452 U.S. 264 (1981). See also the companion case, Hodel v. Indiana. 452 U.S. 314 
(1981). 
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integral operations in areas of traditional function. "28 
The Court explained that Usery is therefore inapplicable to fed-
eral laws which govern directly only the activities of private indi-
viduals or businesses and not states qua states. 
Significantly, the Court also cautioned that "demonstrating 
that these three requirements are met does not, however, guaran-
tee that a Tenth Amendment challenge to congressional com-
merce power action will succeed."29 Once a court finds that a 
statute satisfies all three prongs of the Hodel test, the court must 
balance the federal interest against the state's interest in retaining 
its sovereignty.3o 
Although facially Hodel's three-prong approach offered some 
improvement over Usery's vague criteria, it hardly presented a lit-
mus test for deciding federalism disputes. Rehnquist's ambiguous 
phrases, the subjects of so much previous criticism, were adopted 
by Marshall verbatim.3I Though set out more succinctly, they re-
mained "an abstract without substance."32 
Moreover, Hodel's adoption of Blackmun's balancing test in 
Usery as a "fourth" prong has disquieting similarities with pre-
1937 constitutional adjudication. Before 1937, the Court always 
"balanced" in theory and engaged in unprincipled policy-making 
in practice. "Balancing" is not a test but merely a label for ad hoc 
decision-making unless the Court explains which items go on 
which side of the scale, how much they weigh, and what legal 
principle derives from balancing. 
Hodel's significance, however, is not its elaboration of the 
vague Usery tests, but rather its unmistakable symbolic message. 
It reaffirmed the plenary power of the federal government to regu-
late private entities under the commerce power and thereby pre-
empt state decisions. 
Less than a year after Hodel, the Supreme Court reaffirmed 
its restrictive interpretation of Usery in United Transportation 
Union v. Long Island Railroad Company .33 The issue was whether 
applying federal labor legislation to a state-owned railroad vio-
lated Usery. A unanimous Supreme Court said no, reversing the 
Second Circuit.34 The Court looked at the third prong of the Ho-
28. 452 U.S. at 287-88, quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845, 
852, 854 (1976). 
29. 452 U.S. at 288, n.29. 
30. ld, citing, inter alia, Usery, 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
31. See 452 U.S. at 290. 
32. Usery, 426 U.S. at 860 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
33. 455 U.S. 678 (1982). 
34. The Second Circuit had held that the operation of a railroad was an integral state 
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del test, which focused on traditional state functions.Js The Court 
noted that railroads had been subject to comprehensive federal 
regulation of their operations and labor relations for nearly a cen-
tury and that no comparable history exists of state regulation of 
the railroad industry.36 Federal "regulation of state owned rail-
roads simply does not impair a State's ability to function as a 
State."37 
III. THE FERC CASE 
If Usery created "islands in the stream of commerce"Js which 
are the exclusive province of the states, Hodel and United Trans-
portation Union severely eroded the banks of those islands. Usery 
may mean only that the federal government cannot eliminate the 
states as entities,39 set the wages of the governor and other integral 
state employees who are not engaging in proprietary functions,40 
nor move the state capital.4I In other words, the first two major 
Supreme Court cases in the post-Usery era helped demonstrate 
function, and that the state's interest in running a railroad outweighed the federal interest 
in labor relations. United Transportation Union v. Long Island Railroad, 634 F.2d 19 (2d 
Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 678 (1982). 
35. See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288, quoting Usery, 426 U.S. at 852. 
36. 455 U.S. at 687. 
37. 455 U.S. at 686. 
Several years later the Court upheld the extension of the federal Age Discrimination 
Act to employees of state and local governments (specifically Wyoming game and fish war-
dens) because it also found that the federal law did not "'directly impair' the State's ability 
'to structure integral operations in areas of traditional state functions,' " the same prong of 
the Hodel test relied on in United Transportation Union. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Co=ission v. Wyoming,- U.S.-, 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983). However, this time four of 
the Justices were in dissent. 
The state argued that it needed a mandatory retirement age of 55 to insure its game 
wardens' physical fitness. But Brennan for the Court replied that, under federal law, Wyo-
ming could exclude the unfit as long as it proceeded in a more individualized manner. 
Alternatively, Wyoming could seek to demonstrate that age is a bona fide occupational 
qualification. Finally, the state law did not threaten the structure of state government by 
placing a severe financial burden on the state: the increased costs were speculative and 
might well be balanced by the fact that older workers, while they continue to work, are not 
paid any pension benefits and continue to contribute to the pension fund; when they do 
eventually retire, they receive pension benefits for fewer years. I 03 S. Ct. at I 063. 
Justice Stevens, in a cogent concurring opinion, urged that Usery be overruled. 
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Powell, O'Connor, and Rehnquist, JJ., dissented and 
argued that there "is no hint in the body of the Constitution ratified in 1789 or in the 
relevant amendments that every classification based on age is outlawed." 103 S. Ct. at 
1074. Powell, joined by O'Connor, also wrote a separate dissent objecting to Stevens's 
concurrence and reaffirming their faith in Usery. 
38. Tribe, Federal-State Relations, in 4 J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, THE 
SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1981-1982, at 164 (1983). 
39. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 (1968), overruled in other respects, National 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
40. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
41. Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911). 
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that, in reality, very few aspects of state sovereign authority are, or 
should be, absolutely immune from federal control. The next 
case, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) v. Missis-
sippi; 42 created a significant new restriction on Usery, with its doc-
trine of conditional preemption. But the close five-to-four vote 
may portend problems. 
In the FERC case the Court upheld the Federal Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) against a Usery chal-
lenge. PURPA was designed to combat the then-perceived energy 
crisis plaguing the nation. Generally, PURPA requires state util-
ity commissions to entertain various disputes under the federal 
regulations and to consider certain federal proposals in accord-
ance with federally dictated procedures.43 
The Court began with section 210 of the Act, which en-
couraged the development of cogenerators and small power facili-
ties44 by preempting conflicting state regulations. The majority 
easily upheld this type of federal regulation after Hodel. State au-
thorities are required to enforce standards promulgated by the 
FERC under section 210. In the majority's view, this requirement 
placed no additional burden on the state agencies, since they al-
ready "customarily engaged" in this very type of adjudicatory ac-
tivity.4s Under the supremacy clause, states must enforce federal 
law. As Testa v. Katt4f> had made clear thirty years earlier, state 
courts have an obligation to hear and enforce federal claims. 
State administrative agencies must do the same. 
Titles I and III of PURPA required the states to "consider" 
federal standards dealing with rate structuring and other matters 
relating to the operation of electrical service. The Court observed 
that PURPA did not compel the states to enact regulations, nor 
did it mandate a strict agenda for state agencies. Rather, federal 
law simply conditioned "continued state involvement in a pre-
emptible area" on the consideration of federal proposals.47 As in 
Hodel, Congress allowed the states to continue regulation in this 
42. 456 U.S. 742 (1982). 
43. Because of the national dimensions of the energy problem, the Court had no 
problem in finding that the legislation was within the commerce power. 456 U.S. at 753-
758. 
44. "A 'cogeneration facility' is one that produces both electric energy and steam or 
some other form of useful energy, such as heat." /d. at 750, n.ll. "A 'small power produc-
tion facility' is one that has a production capacity of no more than 80 megawatts and uses 
biomass, waste or renewable resources (such as wind, water, or solar energy) to produce 
electric power." I d. 
45. /d. at 760. 
46. 330 U.S. 386 (1947). 
47. 456 U.S. at 765 (emphasis added). 
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area "on the condition,4s that the states "consider proposed [fed-
eral] regulations .... "49 Congress, in short, "may impose condi-
tions on the State's regulation of private conduct in a pre-emptible 
area."so 
Finally, the Court sustained those portions of PURPA that 
require state commissions to follow certain notice and comment 
procedures when acting on the proposed federal regulations. Al-
though noting these procedural requirements simply establish 
minimum due process guarantees and might be upheld as an exer-
cise of congressional power under section five of the fourteenth 
amendment, the Court instead opted to build on the analysis that 
it had used to uphold section 210. The majority explained: 
[I]f Congress can require a state administrative body to consider proposed regula-
tions as a condition to its continued involvement in a pre-emptible field-and we 
hold today that it can-there is nothing unconstitutional about Congress' requir-
ing certain procedural minima as that body goes about undertaking its tasks. 51 
What is problematic about FERC is that only a bare majority 
sustained the validity of PURP A, in the face of strong opposition 
by four Justices. Even more troubling are the grounds on which 
the four Justices dissented. The dissenting opinions include theo-
ries and ideas which, if accepted, would uproot much present law 
and return to much of the pre-1937 approach to judicial review. 
Justice Powell's dissent applauded "the appeal-and indeed 
wisdom-of Justice O'Connor's evocation of the principles of fed-
eralism,"s2 but concluded that the arguments against the substan-
tive provisions of PURP A were foreclosed by precedent. 
Nevertheless, Powell dissented on the procedural requirements of 
Titles I and II. He rejected what he termed the majority's "threat 
of preemption" reasoning and warned that "if Congress may do 
this, presumably it has the power to pre-empt state court rules of 
civil procedure and judicial review in classes of cases found to 
affect commerce."s3 
Powell inexplicably ignored the enabling provision of the 
fourteenth amendment. The notice and comment procedures de-
scribed in the Act only established minimum due process require-
ments for state utility commission hearings. As such, the 
procedural requirements should at least be a valid exercise of 
48. Id (emphasis added). 
49. Id at 771 (emphasis added). 
50. ld at 769 n. 32. 
51. ld at771. 
52. Id at 771 (Powell. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
53. Id at 775. 
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Congress' power to enforce the due process guarantee of the four-
teenth amendment. 
Powell cited Professor Henry Hart for the proposition that 
"federal law takes state courts as it finds them."s4 However, when 
Hart made this statement in 1954, he noted that state rules must 
"not [be] so rigorous as, in effect, to nullify the asserted rights"ss_ 
the very reason why Congress imposed basic procedural protec-
tions in FERC. The federal government has every right to expect 
that the states will consider fairly its proposals. 
A long line of cases under the Federal Employers' Liability 
Act (FELA) unequivocally demonstrates that Congress does in-
deed have authority to regulate state procedure in order to protect 
federal interests. Under the FELA Congress can decide in a fed-
eral civil case brought in state court what issues must go to the 
jury.s6 If Congress can mandate such procedures in order to affect 
the substantive outcome of a case brought in a state trial court, it 
ought to be able to mandate similar procedures in proceedings 
brought before state agencies, particularly since PURPA allows 
the states to avoid using the procedures by abandoning the area 
altogether. Justice Powell failed to mention the FELA precedents 
and the role of conditional preemption, just as he had ignored the 
implications of section five of the fourteenth amendment. 
Unlike Justice Powell, Justice O'Connor's dissent concen-
trates on the Court's substantive holdings. Her dissent's con-
clusory statements are reminiscent of the Court's pre-1937 
approach and fail to provide any tests or guidance for future con-
stitutional analysis. The crux of the dissent is her rejection of the 
concept of conditional preemption. Her argument, if accepted, 
would greatly expand the scope of Usery. Her argument is also 
inconsistent with the reasoning of the precedents in the spending 
clause cases, including one opinion by Justice O'Conner herse}f.s7 
Justice O'Connor likened the statutory provisions in FERC to 
those in Usery, ss but her analogy ignores a crucial distinction. 
54. ld at 773, quoting Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 
COLUM. L. REV. 489. 508 (1954). 
55. Hart, supra note 54, at 508. CJ. Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375. 399 (1955) 
(Clark, J., dissenting). See also Hart. The Time Chart o.fthe Justices, 73 HARV. L. REv. 84, 
116 (1959). 
56. For example, a state court hearing an FELA case cannot circumvent a litigant's 
right to a jury trial by refusing to submit to the jury one phase of the question of fraudulent 
releases, even though under state law that issue would not have gone to the jury. Dice v. 
Akron, C. & Y. R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 363-69 (1952). See also Rogers v. Missouri Pacific 
R.R .. 352 U.S. 500. 510 (1957). 
. 57. Bell v. New Jersey,- U.S.-. 103 S. Ct. 2187 (1983) (states must honor obliga-
tions freely assumed when agreeing to participate in a federal grant-in-aid program). 
58. 456 U.S. at 775 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See note 25 supra. 
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The federal law in Usery gave the states no options. It did not 
allow the states to avoid paying the minimum wage by having the 
federal government take over the activity (e.g., hospitals) and pay 
the minimum wage. The Usery Court in effect held that such a 
cost-free arrangement in favor of the federal government would 
impermissibly interfere with the functioning of state governmental 
bodies; that same Court implied that the arrangement prevalent in 
the spending clause cases, analogous to conditional preemption, 
would yield a different result.s9 
In FERC, as in the spending clause cases, Congress gave the 
states an option: they could regulate public utilities in conformity 
with federal requirements or they could elect not to enforce the 
federal mandate. In that case the federal government would to-
tally preempt the field and assume all the costs of the program. In 
Usery, although the federal government wanted the states to pay 
its hospital workers above a certain wage, it was not willing to 
take over the hospitals to assure that the workers were well paid. 
Phrased another way, in Usery the federal government told the 
states: "You pay the piper, but we'll call the tunes." In FERC the 
federal government said to the states: "You pay the piper and you 
call the tunes. We would like you to call certain tunes. If you 
refuse, then we will pay the piper and we will call the tunes." 
The fact that the federal government is willing to assume the 
full burden of direct regulation provides an inner political check. 
That is, forces within the political decision-making structure help 
assure that decisions are carefully thought out and that federal 
control is not lightly exercised. As Justice Stone said in a slightly 
different context: 
[T]he thought, often expressed in judicial opinion, [is] that when the regulation is 
of such a character that its burden falls principally upon those without the state. 
legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are 
normally exened on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within 
the State60 
Conditional preemption provides a similar political check. 
59. Userv. 426 U.S. at 852. n.l7. Under the tenth amendment. Congress might not be 
able to take over the state police. However, assuming that such is the case, the argument in 
the text would apply to many other state activities such as hospitals. Even as to state po-
lice, Usery left open the possibility of reaching such activities under the spending clause. 
For example, Congress should be able to provide that state police paid in pan with federal 
funds must be paid the minimum wage. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Service Com-
mission, 330 U.S. 127 (1947). See generally, P. HAY & R. RoTUNDA, THE UNITED STATES 
FEDERAL SYSTEM: LEGAL INTEGRATION IN THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 169-84 (1982). 
60. South Carolina State Highway Depanment v. Barnwell Bros., Inc .. 303 U.S. 177. 
185, n. 2 (1938). Cf United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n. 4 (1938) 
(Stone, J.). 
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Justice O'Connor's objection that such conditional preemp-
tion "blurs the lines of political accountability" is similarly unper-
suasive. This "blurring" has not been regarded as justification to 
overturn the spending clause cases, to which O'Connor has never 
voiced any objection.6t 
Finally, Justice O'Connor's discussion of the application of 
Hodel to the FERC case exemplifies her use of ipse dixits and 
conclusory statements in place of useful tests or explanations. As 
to the first prong of the Hodel test, Titles I and III of PURPA 
apparently regulate the "states as states." But the other prongs are 
more problematic. To satisfy the second prong concerning "at-
tributes of state sovereignty," O'Connor analogizes the situation 
in FERC to Congress requiring "state legislatures to debate bills 
drafted by congressional committees."62 The analogy is weak: 
while Congress could not outlaw state legislatures, it could in ef-
fect outlaw a state utility agency by completely preempting the 
field. O'Connor then disposes of the third prong by announcing 
that "utility regulation is a traditional function of state govem-
ment."63 No authority is cited for this proposition, and in fact 
there is also a long history of federal regulation of utilities.64 Fi-
nally, O'Connor does not address the exception, mentioned in Ho-
del, 65 of a federal interest so strong that it requires state 
submission despite satisfaction of all three prongs of the Hodel 
test. Given O'Connor's conclusion, she should explain why this 
exception was inapplicable to FERC. Is her silence intended to 
indicate a belief that there is no strong federal interest in energy 
policy? Like the pre-1937 justices, O'Connor is apparently willing 
to immunize certain areas from federal regulation based on her 
own unarticulated views of desirable social policy. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Does FERC portend continued a narrowing of Usery? If 
only one Justice changes his mind, will a future Court later use the 
tenth amendment analysis of Usery to substitute its economic 
judgments for those of Congress? Four justices thought that 
61. See notes 24 and 25, supra. 
62. 456 U.S. at 780 (O'Connor, J. dissenting) (emphasis added). 
63. ld 
64. Such regulation takes the form of tax subsidies, regulation on entry and antitrust 
policy, direct regulation of oil and gas prices, tariff and impon and expon restrictions, 
energy allocation regulations, and so on. See generally, T. MoRGAN, EcONOMic REGULA-
TION OF BUSINESS (1976); W. RODGERS, ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW (1979); 
H. WILLIAMS, R. MAXWELL, & C. MEYERS, THE LAW OF 0tL AND GAS (1974); Posner, 
Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548 (1969). 
65. 452 U.S. at 288, n. 29. 
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FERC was akin to Usery and regarded the federal regulation as 
invalid.66 Four Justices upheld the federal regulation but also 
thought that Usery had been wrongly decided.67 Only Justice 
Blackmun thought that both Usery and FERC were correct. 
The judicial technique of balancing interests is quite proper 
when balancing leads to some definable rule or test. But when 
that purported balancing fails to yield some ascertainable princi-
ple, we simply have ipse dixits by judicial Caliphs. In the end, as 
noted by Henry Hart long ago: 
[I]pse dixits are futile as instruments for the exercise of "the judicial power of the 
United States." As such they settle little or nothing more than the case in hand, 
and attempted rationalizations of them serve more often to create, than to relieve 
doubts in other cases. Only opinions which are grounded in reason and not on 
mere fiat or precedent can do the job which the Supreme Court of the United 
States has to do [because the Court does not] have the power either in theory or in 
practice to ram its own personal preferences down other people's throats.68 
After Usery, lower courts and commentators could not deci-
pher the message of the High Court. Confusion reigned until the 
Court provided some clarification in Hodel and LIRR. After 
FERC, however, given the frail majority and the fact that parts of 
the opinion of the Court were written quite narrowly, the possibil-
ity exists that one of the justices may simply change his mind on 
slightly different facts.69 
FERC should be read to hold that Congress may impose con-
i... ditions upon continuation of state regulation in any field that is 
federally preemptible.7o As such, FERC usefully limits Usery. 
Basically, Usery should only mean that federal law cannot elimi-
nate the states, set the salary of the state governor and other some-
66. Powell, O'Connor, and Rehnquist, J.J., and Burger, C.J. 
67. Brennan. White, Marshall, Stevens. 
68. Hart, supra note 55, at 99. 
69. See 456 U.S. at 746-50. If the statute provided penalties or required the state to 
adopt federal standards, would the case come out differently for Blackmun? Surely Con-
gress ought to be able to say: adopt these federal standards or the federal government will 
preempt the area. As Justice Blackmun did state in one portion of his opinion. "[s)o long as 
the field is preemptible- the nature of the condition is [ir]relevant." ld at 768 n.30. 
70. Professor Tribe has argued that such an interpretation of FERC would be "mis-
leading." He offers instead a strained attempt to narrow the result in FERC while giving a 
broad reading to Usery. See Tribe, Supreme Court Review and Constitutional Law 5_vmpo-
sium. 51 U.S.L.W. 2248 (1982). See also Tribe, Federal-Stare Relations, in 4 J. CHOPER. Y. 
KAMISAR, & L. TRIBE, THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1981-1982 
(1983), at 167: 
State agencies may be required to settle disputes about federal regulations that 
are analogous to those state disputes they already handle and to consider (not 
adopt) federal proposals in accord with federal procedures that simply broaden 
participation a bit beyond that prescribed by state procedures, because such con-
ditions are both minimally intrusive and fully consistent with federalism's under-
lying value of broader local participation in government. 
1984] USERY 55 
what similar state workers, or move the state capital. But if 
Congress can preempt an area of regulation, the proper reading of 
FERC allows it instead to condition the state's continued involve-
ment in a pre-emptible area on the state's acceptance of the fed-
eral requirements.?! The alternative view, that of the dissenting 
opinions inFERC, would invite the Court to return to its pre-1937 
legacy and make economic policy in the guise of constitutional 
analysis. 
71. See text accompanying notes 43-45. supra. This interpretation would not drain 
Userr of all meaning. The tenth amendment. upon which Userr is based. indicates that 
some powers are reserved to the state and therefore cannot be preempted by Congress. 
When exercising these powers. the states would be protected by Usery. 
For further analysis of these issues, see Rotunda, The Doctrine of Conditional Preemp-
tion and Other Limitattons on Tenth Amendment Restricuons. 132 U. PENN. L. REv. -
(1984). 
